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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
A jury convicted defendant of one count of burglary, a second-degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995) and one count of theft,
a second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995).
Because defendant's convictions are for second-degree felonies, this Court has
original appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp.
1995).
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did defendant's attorney provide ineffective assistance when she elicited
information from him on direct examination about a prior felony conviction and
his being on parole when this offense occurred?1 This Court reviews an
1

Because defendant does not separately analyze article 1, § 12 of the Utah
Constitution, the State will discuss this issue in terms of the federal constitution. State v.

ineffective assistance of counsel claim as a matter of law when it arises on direct
appeal. State v. Saunders. 893 P.2d 584, 591 (Utah App. 1995).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUES, AND RULES
Because no provisions are particularly relevant, none are included in the
addenda.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Statement of Facts
The crime
Joan Coles returned from work on August 2, 1994 and discovered that
someone had broken in to her home (R. 224). Although she had left the windows
and doors locked that morning, she found the window open about six inches and
glass in the door shattered (i$L). The wood frame to the door also was shattered
and the door was open toward the inside of the house (R. 226). She found that
most of her CD collection, two opera videotapes, an Olympus 29 camera, and a
Sony Car Diskman CD player were missing (R. 229). Later that day, Ms. Coles
called the owner of Discriminator Records, a classical music store, to let him
know that many of her CDs had been stolen. The owner, William A.

Bote, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990).
2

Goldsmith, was a long-time friend of Ms. Coles, and agreed to keep an eye out
for anyone trying to sell her CDs (R. 292).
Upon returning from a trip, William Coles, Joan Coles' husband,
discovered that three bags, a Kirkham's bag and two book bags, were missing
(R. 258-61). One blue bag had a particular knot in one of the straps that Mr.
Coles had tied to keep it from slipping (R. 258; State's exhibit No. I). 2
Robert Nyman, defendant's housemate, saw defendant with the bag the
afternoon of August 2, 1994 when he picked up defendant and brought him
home. Defendant told Nyman that he had CDs in the bag. When Nyman
brought him home, defendant unloaded the CDs and videotapes on the table (R.
275) and asked Nyman to sell the items for him because he did not have any
identification (R. 276).
The next day, at defendant's request, Nyman took half the CDs to the Gray
Whale II for appraisal and took the rest to Discriminator Records (R. 278-79).
Defendant stayed in the car while Nyman took the CDs into Discriminator (R.
277). After noticing that some of the CDs were similar to ones he had sold to
Joan Coles, Mr. Goldsmith called her and started going through the CDs by title

2

At trial, the bag was marked as State's exhibit no. 1. Mr. Coles identified it as

his(R. 229).
3

(R. 291). The assortment of CDs that Nyman brought in included a unique
collection of Italian Renaissance lute music, a copy of which a professor had
given Coles and Goldsmith many years previously (MJ. Because this CD was a
personal recording of a friend, Goldsmith believed it unlikely that any other
people in the city would have it (id*). Coles agreed to call the police to come to
Discriminator while Goldsmith stalled for time by studiously examining each CD
(R. 292).
The police came approximately one half hour later and began questioning
Nyman about the CDs (R. 293). Nyman told Officer George Pregman that
defendant had brought the CDs home with him the night before and that he was
waiting outside in a pickup truck. Officer Pregman went to the car and began
talking to defendant and immediately noticed that defendant was fidgety and
sweating very hard (R. 306). At Officer Pregman's request, defendant went into
Discriminator where the police questioned him further (R. 306-7). Defendant
initially denied knowing Nyman (i$L), but later changed his story to say that
although he knew Nyman, he did not know where the CDs came from (R. 314).
During questioning, defendant provided Officers Pregman and Reese an alias,
i.e., Steve Falconi, and an incorrect social security number. (R. 307, 313).

4

Accompanied by Nyman, and with his permission, Officer Reese went to
his house to conduct a search (R. 314). There, Officer Reese found two videos,
a cassette, two blue bags, one of which had the name Kirkham's on it, an
Olympus camera, and a Sony Car Diskman, with electrical adaptors and
headphones (R. 314-15). The police then arrested defendant (R. 320).
At trial, defendant claimed that he received the CDs and other items from a
business partner who was unable to pay back a $500 loan (R. 336-37).
Defendant never named the partner. Defendant said he went to his friend's home
at about 2:30, retrieved the CD collection, along with the camera and diskman,
walked down to 9th East Second South and called Nyman for a ride home (R.
340-342). Defendant admitted that he lied to the police when he initially denied
knowing Nyman (R. 348).
The trial
During his trial for theft and burglary, defendant testified that the reason he
gave police an alias was due to his fear that he would be sent back to prison
because he was on parole as a result of a felony he committed 13 years ago.
Q. (by defendant's attorney) I want to talk to you a little bit about
when the police officers were questioning you, you heard them state
several times that you used another name, name of Steve Falconi?
A. (by defendant) Yes.
5

Q. Explain to the jury were [sic] why you used the name Steve
Falconi?
A. I was arrested about thirteen years ago. I will be honest, I got
convicted of a felony about thirteen years ago. I was on parole at
the time and what happened was I was actually in a halfway house,
and I had absconded from the halfway house, and that's why I gave
them the facilities name—
Q. Can you explain to the jury what "absconded" means?

A. It means I ran from the halfway house.
Q. When did that happen?
A. It was about the first part of or the end of June, the end of June.

Q. You also gave him [Robert Nyman] the name "Steve Falconi.''
Can you tell the jury why you told him that your name was Steve
Falconi?
A. Like I said, you know, I took off from the halfway house. I was
real scared. I didn't want anybody to know my real name. My real
name is Guido John Alvillar. I didn't want to go back to prison is
the reason I didn't told [sic] everybody a different name.
Q. Now, when the police officers interviewed you at the
Discriminator Records, you heard you told them you didn't know
anything about the CD's. Would you explain to the jury why you
said that?
A. Well, really, when they were talking, they were talking about
arresting me, taking me to jail. I figured I had ran from the halfway
6

house. I was wanted by adult probation and parole, and I just, I was
real scared, you know, and you know, I admit I did tell them a false
statement. I am coming forth now. I admit I did have the property.
It was my property. It was given to me.
(R. 343-44).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The defense attorney's request to defendant to explain his reasons for
giving police an alias was a legitimate strategic decision that does not constitute
deficient performance. Courts view an attorney's decision in a highly deferential
light, recognizing that even legitimate tactical or strategic decisions may backfire.
Failure to obtain acquittal does not establish ineffective assistance. Unless
defendant can establish, as a matter of law, that the tactic here was not reasonable
under that strict test, and that it was prejudicial, then defendant's claim of
ineffective assistance must fail. Given the clear evidence that Steve Falconi was
not defendant's actual name, the attorney may have believed the jury would be
more inclined to sympathize with defendant's deception if it knew the reason for
the deceit was to stay out of prison.
Defendant's mea culpa probably had no effect on the jury's guilty verdicts
given the other evidence of guilt. Defendant cannot claim that, but for this
admission, there is a reasonable probability he would have obtained a more
7

favorable result. Therefore, under the second prong of the "ineffective assistance
of counsel" standard, defendant's claim also must fail.
ARGUMENT
I.

EXPLAINING THE REASON FOR DEFENDANT'S
ALIAS WAS A REASONABLE TRIAL
STRATEGY; THEREFORE, TRIAL COUNSEL'S
ASSISTANCE WAS NOT DEFICIENT.

To show ineffective assistance of counsel, trial counsel must establish that
the alleged error was not the result of "conscious trial strategy." State v.
EllifrilZ, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 1992). In reaching this decision, the
courts "indulge in the strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must
overcome the presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action
might be considered sound trial strategy." State v. Garrett. 835 P.2d 578, 579
(Utah App. 1993). In effect, this strong presumption can only be overcome by a
lack of any "conceivable tactical basis" for counsel's action. LL
Faced with strong evidence of guilt, defendant's attorney had to find a way
to make her client appear credible to the jury because the only way to overcome
the State's evidence was for the jury to believe defendant's story. Through the
State's case in chief, the jury learned that defendant had given police an alias and

8

a false social security number in his first interview. This evidence presented her
with a dilemma, i.e., defendant could allow the jury to speculate about the reason
for the alias or he could give them an explanation. Counsel called defendant to
the stand and asked him to explain why he gave the police a false name. In doing
so, it is conceivable that she had the following goals in mind: (1) to make
defendant appear sympathetic, due to his desperate fear to return to prison; and
(2) to make defendant appear straightforward and honest by allowing him to
explain his criminal history without hesitation.
The record suggests that the decision to testify about this matter may have
been defendant's. During the hearing on a motion in limine, in response to the
trial court's question whether the issues regarding the motion had been resolved,
stated: "Yes, your Honor. I did bring up the fact about parole, however. Mr.
Alvillar has said he'll be bringing up that up on his own" (R. 162). Also, while
the jury was deliberating, the trial court asked defendant he was satisfied with his
attorney's representation (R. 385). Although defendant noted a few things that
he "wanted said to the jury," he never mentioned he was dissatisfied with the
attorney's asking him to explain the alias (R. 385-88). This omission indicates
that the alias testimony was one of the things he wanted said to the jury that was
said.
9

Federal courts recognize that the necessities of trial may allow a defense
attorney to introduce evidence not always favorable to the defendant. In Patel v.
United States. 19 F.3d 1231, 1236 (7th Cir. 1994), the appellate court ruled that
a trial attorney's elicitation of adverse information from the defendant was not
ineffective assistance. The court concluded that the counsel's decision to have
the defendant tell the jury what he knew, which implicated him in some criminal
activity, was a reasonable strategic decision because in doing so he also told the
jury what he did not know. LL; S££ also. Adkinsv. Singletary. 965 F.2d 952,
960 (11th Cir. 1992) (attorney's failure to object to evidence of defendant's
sexual proclivities not ineffective because it was a trial tactic). Here also,
defendant's admission of past criminal conduct constituted a simultaneous attempt
to present defendant as an honest and repentant individual. Although ultimately
unsuccessful, this trial tactic was a conscious and legitimate choice and,
therefore, not deficient performance.
H.

THE CHALLENGED QUESTIONS DID NOT
PREJUDICE DEFENDANT'S CASE.

In a challenge to his trial counsel's effectiveness, defendant shoulders the
burden not just to prove deficient performance but also to prove that the deficient
performance prejudiced him. Garrett, 849 P.2d at 580. To show "prejudice,"
10

defendant must establish that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." Id; (quoting Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S.
668, 694).
Under this standard, defendant must convince this Court that, if the alleged
error had not occurred, there is a reasonable probability that the result would
have been more favorable. Garrett. 849 P.2d at 580. In arguing that he makes
that showing, defendant gives too little credence to the evidence of defendant's
guilt. The uncontested testimony showed that Nyman saw defendant on August
2, 1994 at 9th East Second South, carrying a blue Kirkham's bag containing
approximately 100 CDs and two videocassettes. On that same day, at her home
at 1327 East Third Avenue, Joan Coles found approximately 100 CDs and two
videocassettes missing from her home. When the police searched Nyman's
house, they saw in defendant's room an Olympus 29 camera, a car diskman with
adaptors, and blue bags. Mr. and Mrs. Coles later identified all these items as
theirs.
This case is almost identical to State v. Boyatt. 854 P.2d 550, 553 (Utah
App. 1993), in which the defendant challenged his trial counsel's question that
11

elicited evidence of a prior conviction. This Court skipped the "deficient
performance" prong of the Strickland test and analyzed the error in terms of its
prejudicial impact.3 LL In Boyatt. this Court stressed the incredibility of the
defendant's story and the strength of the other evidence in holding that the "jury
could disbelieve Boyatt's story even without considering the fact that he had a
prior felony conviction." Boyatt. 854 P.2d at 554.
Like Boyatt, defendant destroyed his own credibility not by the admission
of his criminal past, but by his constantly changing stories to the police about his
name, his social security number, and Nyman's purported involvement in the
crime. In all likelihood the jury also attributed some importance to defendant's
failure to provide a credible explanation for how he came to possess the Coles'
property. Especially significant is defendant's failure to provide the name of the
"business partner" who allegedly provided him with the CDs and other items.
Looking at all the evidence, it is not reasonably probable that the prior conviction
evidence influenced the result. Therefore, defendant cannot show that the alleged
ineffectiveness prejudiced him.

3

A fundamental difference between this case and Boyatt. however, is shown by
the Boyatt court's apparent belief that the trial counsel's action was not a legitimate trial
strategy. Bovatt. 854 P.2d at 553-54 n.2. Here, as discussed in Point I, defendant's trial
counsel had a reason to ask the question.
12

CONCLUSION
Defendant's convictions should be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED; PUBLISHED OPINION
REQUESTED
The State does not believe that oral argument will assist the Court in its
decisionmaking process. The State does request a published opinion because no
other reported Utah case analyzes an ineffective assistance claim under the first
prong of the Strickland standard when the allegation of error deals with bringing
out evidence of a prior conviction. Though it gives helpful precedent on the
second prong of the Strickland standard, Boyatt does not deal with the "deficient
performance'' test. Therefore, publication would assist courts and practitioners
in this area. An opinion would be especially useful because it may assist
attorneys in making pre-trial decisions on appropriate strategy.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS ]ML day of December 1995.
JAN GRAHAM
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
JAMES H. BEADLES
Assistant Attorney General
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